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Of the various social reforms China has undergone over the past three decades, perhaps none has impacted individual Chinese citizens and families more intimately and with such profound large-scale social consequences than evolving family planning policies designed to dramatically slow China’s population growth. Coinciding with various economic and social reforms, China implemented a controversial fertility policy starting in 1980 that is arguably the largest social experiment in governmental control of human reproduction in world history. The results of this three-decade-long, ongoing experiment have dramatically reshaped China’s demographic make-up, been a critically important contributing factor in China’s economic rise over the past three decades, and presented considerable looming social and economic challenges as a generation born under this policy starts to come into its own.

In a September 25th, 1980 publication put out by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, An Open Letter to Members of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Communist Youth League on Controlling Population Growth, the rationale was provided to the Chinese people for introducing an admittedly unpopular fertility policy that by and large restricted families to having one child. Essentially, the argument was that rapid and unchecked population growth severely hampered society in providing adequate food, clothing, housing, transportation, education, medical care, and employment; unless drastic measures were undertaken, China faced daunting obstacles to increase the standard of living for a rapidly growing population with increased consumption demands for limited resources. Increased population would strain natural resources including water, energy, and arable land, as well as pose real food security issues. Consequently, the Chinese government felt compelled to implement a stringent fertility policy that would limit one child per family.

In order to implement the policy, the Chinese government used both financial incentives for complying with the policy as well as harsh penalties for noncompliance. A veritable army of birth control officials were added to the government bureaucracy in order to implement and monitor the policy throughout the country. In the early stages of this mass campaign, some of these officials used incredibly coercive tactics to meet target birth rate goals, including forced abortions and forced sterilization . As one can imagine, human rights groups (especially some women’s rights groups) loudly condemned the policies. Such measures were deeply resented as well by many in China, especially in the more culturally traditional countryside, and a groundswell of discontent resulted in the government adjusting the policy in 1984 an again in 1986 in order to allow a more diversified approach; consequently, some provinces allowed rural couples to have a second child if the first child was a girl and some areas allowed couples multiple children if one spouse was a single child already.

Indeed, perhaps one of the biggest misconceptions of China’s fertility policies over the past three decades is that it is a one-size-fits-all “one-child” policy; in fact, population control policies are really a multi-policy phenomenon with regulations that change according to the geographic location of a couple, their ethnic make-up, and whether or not they themselves come from a single child family or have siblings. National minorities such as Mongols, Tibetans, and Uighurs are exempt from family planning policies, and different regulations pertain to rural citizens and urban citizens. That being said, most families in China (especially in growing urban and suburban areas) are single child units. In fact, China has not only achieved its goal of reducing the birth rate to “replacement” level (2.1 per woman) but very likely has a below replacement level (estimated between 1.22 to 1.8 per woman – unreliable birth reporting is one negative consequence of the resistance to complying with the policies).

The social and cultural consequences of pursuing this radical population control policy are enormous. For a civilization profoundly shaped by Confucian principles of filial respect for elders, the new status of a single child becoming the focus of familial hopes and aspirations has certainly changed intergenerational relationships. A couple of generations of single child families has resulted in a society of so-called “little emperors and empresses;” that is to say, generations of single children who are often spoiled and indulged by parents and grandparents and with an outsized sense of entitlement. This, of course, is a stereotype that masks other aspects of this generation – a tremendous burden each child carries on his/her shoulder as their parents’ future security (and often two sets of grandparents as well). Many single children feel a sense of loneliness as they compete first for top grades that will ensure placement in key schools and then for securing a well paying job.

Another important consequence of this policy is a gender imbalance that has resulted in a sizable population of bachelors (this group of men are called “bare branches” in Chinese since they have little prospect of being able to carry on their family lineage). Traditionally there was a very practical preference for having sons since they were less likely to move away from a family once they married and were thus a more assured guarantee for taking care of their parents later in life. This preference is reflected in disproportionate birth ratios of male to female births – as high as 121:100 in 2007. While cases of female infanticide are as sensational in China as they would be in any other country, there has been an undeniable trend of sex-selective abortions and reduced infant care for females that has contributed to a slightly higher infant mortality rate for females even as male infant mortality rates have consistently declined. The eventual social consequence of this gender imbalance is a bride shortage once young men and women reach marriageable age. Often those men who remain bachelors are among the poorest and most marginalized in society – a trend that government officials eye nervously since this group of “bare branches” are ripe for either criminal activity or contributing to potential social unrest.

One final consequence of the thirty years of population control policies is that China is a rapidly aging society with a dramatic change in the distribution of population by age. The generation of men and women born around the time when China’s fertility policies were first introduced represent the largest age profile and when they came of age in the 1990s and 2000s they made up a very eager and skilled labor force. As this age cohort starts to get older, the generations born after represent a smaller percentage of the total population; as a consequence, economists and sociologists question what effect this will have on China’s long term economic prospects. Complicating this picture is a health care system that is already strained and a pension care system that is rudimentary at best; suffice it to say that the little emperors will inherit a very complicated situation as they begin to care for their elderly parents and grandparents.

China’s fertility policies are undeniably controversial but have also been praised as necessary measures for the well-being of not only China but the world – at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, vice-minister of National Population and Family Planning Commission of China deftly argued that stabilizing China’s fertility rate has resulted in significant reduction of CO2 emissions and made the world a safer place. Critics of the policy find such arguments specious, at best, and have urged the government to change course. The original proponents of China’s fertility policies certainly never intended the policy to be implemented in perpetuity; as recently as 2010, the government revisited whether to phase out the policies and cautiously decided to continue with its current policies. To be sure, the policies have been a contributing factor in China’s economic resilience over the past thirty years although it will be curious to see how long the policy and its effects will be considered a beneficial aspect of China’s reform period or whether it will be considered a failure in the aggregate.

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Contemporary China’s incredible path to economic development officially began during the opening meeting of the Communist Party’s (CPC) Central Committee on December 18, 1978. Known as the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, this meeting of the top 300 Communist Party members elected by the Party Congress, was the occasion when Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power against Mao Zedong’s successor, Hua Guofeng, by working to reinstate reform-minded officials and overturning policies that continued the Maoist line. Deng’s considerable political strength allowed him the freedom to carry out his policy of “Reform and Opening Up” (改革开放 gaige kaifang), even in the face of major ideological and political challenges.

Deng, who assumed the role of paramount leader of China despite never holding the official government positions, was anxious to move the country past the tumult of the Cultural Revolution, a period during which he had been twice purged. The country was in dire straits both economically and in agricultural production, and the government lacked the capital to undertake much-needed infrastructure projects. In order to jump-start the economy, Deng’s administration enacted three significant policies: the promotion of the household-responsibility system to the national level, the introduction of dual-track pricing, and the opening of key coastal areas to direct foreign investment. These initiatives generated significant economic activity by putting money into the hands of farmers (in 1978, the majority of the Chinese population lived in rural areas), providing an incentive for agricultural and industrial workers to increase production, and generating foreign capital and business.

The household responsibility system essentially decollectivized agriculture into private plots. Since the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) land use had been distributed collectively as “people’s communes”. This restructuring put the responsibility for production, including the profits and losses, onto “households” (or sets of households in many cases), who leased land from the state. The government, in turn, demanded a reduced quota at a very low fixed rate. For any goods (grain, steel, etc.) beyond this quota, however, farmers or workers were allowed to sell their product on the market at an unregulated price. Production soared, solving any looming food crisis, and people started making money. This combination of fixed state procurement prices and unregulated market pricing became known as dual-track pricing. By establishing a free market system alongside the existing planned economy, the government introduced powerful economic incentives that unleashed a torrent of entrepreneurial activity.

Deng also pushed the opening of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in key coastal locations, for the most part situated in close proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan. With four original SEZs (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou & Xiamen) followed by the opening of fourteen more zones a few years later, China provided the arena for foreign companies to take advantage of China’s enormous low-cost workforce and establish manufacturing operations. An era of “Made in China” had begun.

The 1980s were exciting years for China, but the excitement reached a tragic climax with the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. After two months of intense protests and fearing greater instability, Deng authorized the use of the army to clear the streets of protestors. An unknown number (ranging from 300 to 800 people) were killed in the ensuing clash, and countless others were arrested. Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the CPC and in many ways the director of Deng’s reforms, was stripped of his titles and put under house arrest as part of the conservative backlash within the government.

In the immediate years following the 1989 Tiananment Incident, Deng recognized the risk of economic stagnation and a threat to long-term economic reforms and so undertook a tour of the Special Economic Zones in 1992 during which, in a speech delivered in Shenzhen, he gave his unequivocal support to the SEZs. Deng’s Southern Tour, as the event is commonly known, instilled confidence in the Chinese economic reforms, and sent the message that business was back on the agenda. With renewed vigor and the support of Zhu Rongji as Premier, China entered a new stage of reform, opening greater areas of land to investment. Shanghai’s Pudong district, as the hub for the entire Yangtze River Delta, was redeveloped from farmland to become one of the most striking metropolitan skylines in the world.

Deng Xiaoping died in 1997 at the age of 93, but his passing in no way brought about an end to the reform era; indeed, China saw its strongest growth years between 2003 and 2007 (averaging around 11% each year) and, since 2010, now boasts the second largest economy in the world. But with all these triumphs, the country has a long way to go to completely alleviate poverty and resolve an ever-widening income gap. While the CPC’s 12th Five Year Plan, approved by the National People’s Congress in 2011, reveals the government’s reliance on large-scale infrastructure projects to fuel growth, the government has acknowledged the need to reorient the economy from a lower-value manufacturing based economy to one supported by domestic demand and hi-tech development. Similarly, the environment is high on the agenda, as the industrial free-for-all of the past thirty years has exacerbated an already tenuous ecological situation. China’ s incredible successes during the reform era are unprecedented in human history, but there are enormous challenges that China faces in the coming years.

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The struggle to feed and provide enough natural resources such as clean water, timber, and coal to meet the needs of China’s population has agonized leaders and policymakers throughout Chinese history. Farm collectivization and mass campaigns to eliminate pests and reclaim land often met with spectacular failure during Mao Zedong’s tenure, resulting in millions of deaths from famine during the Great Leap Forward. Clearly the old socialist system could not produce enough food to meet the needs of China’s vast population, one of the major issues that Deng Xiaoping sought to address through his reforms. Not only did Deng’s reforms lead to increases in agricultural production and GDP growth, but they brought major shifts in how Chinese interacted with the natural environment.

Farmers began to experiment with private plots and selling their surpluses on the black market as it became clear that collectivized farming could not meet the needs of their families. The success of the re-privatization of these small farms was eventually given official sanction under Deng Xiaoping in 1983 and termed the household responsibility system. Under Deng, the household responsibility system drastically lowered the quota requirement for farms and allowed for the sale of surplus agricultural produce on the free market. The creation of a free market rendered the old system of grain rationing based on an individual’s hùkǒu (household registration) obsolete. Agricultural production soared and previously subsistence level farmers began to accumulate wealth. In turn, rising levels of wealth in the cities increased demand for more expensive vegetables, meat, and fish.

Despite improved economic livelihood in rural areas, foreign investment created even greater opportunities in cities as the demand for cheap labor and service jobs grew following Deng’s reforms. Once draconian controls on movement based on hukou classification were lifted as residency permit checks, arrests, and repatriation became less frequent. What followed has been the greatest human migration in the history of the world as people have increasingly flowed from economically depressed rural areas to booming cities along China’s east coast. A mass exodus of people of working age out of the countryside left grandparents and small children to tend the farms. Rural residents, estimated at about 80% of China’s population at the start of the reform era now account for only about half of China’s population , a dramatic change for a country that staked its revolution on rural peasants.

Until the mid-1980’s growth rates in the agricultural sector achieved significant gains from the increased efficiency of the household responsibility system and rising agricultural prices. During the latter half of the 1980’s agricultural growth began to decline and industry and services became an increasingly important part of the Chinese economy . To stem internal migration, to increase economic growth in rural areas, and to persuade farmers to stay on the land, local and provincial authorities encouraged the creation of township and village enterprises (TVEs). TVEs were typically small-scale private businesses located in rural areas and provided an important alternative source of income that served to cushion farmers in times of low crop yield and fluctuating crop prices as state price controls were lifted.

While contributing to a significant portion of farmers’ incomes and to China’s overall GDP, TVEs are also credited with the loss of agricultural land to industry and the rapid environmental decline of many rural towns. TVEs are notoriously hard to monitor since they are small and decentralized and often have strong support in local government officials who realize their economic importance. The resulting environmental impact on China’s forests, water, and air during the reform period has been devastating. In particular, many TVEs lack advanced equipment for processing waste water and air pollutants, and as a result discharge industrial waste water directly into local streams and groundwater. In prioritizing economic growth over environmental protection, local officials allowed TVEs significant leeway in their negligent environmental practices.

Exact numbers on China’s environmental situation are difficult to come by, but general figures point to a discouraging trend. Since the start of reform and opening, China has lost an estimated 1/5 of its farmland to development and desertification. Pollution and climate change has contributed to crop failures and droughts and turned farmers into environmental refugees. Officials, aware of increasing protests over environmental issues and the historical importance of keeping rural farmers economically secure, have begun to take the pollution situation more seriously since the mid-2000s. Particularly egregious polluters were forced to close and the national government offered subsidies for retrofitting factories with equipment that would reduce the discharge of polluted air and water. Lake Taihu, on the border of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces in eastern China is one such notable success. After devastating algae blooms in 2007 left millions in the region without water, officials and residents near the lake embarked on a plan to decrease pollution and nitrogen levels in the lake. Pollution levels in the lake have begun to improve and the lake is once again becoming a popular tourist destination. Even with this one encouraging example, however, the ability to balance continued GDP growth and the environmental impact of such growth on food and water security promises to remain one of the biggest challenges facing contemporary China.

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Although some textbooks continue to occasionally refer to the Yellow River valley and the northern plain of north China as the “cradle of Chinese civilization,” spectacular archaeological finds in the 20th and 21st centuries have increasingly challenged the way we see early China and the formation of Chinese civilization during the Bronze Age period (ca. 2000 BCE – 221 BCE). These archaeological finds include areas such as the famed Sanxingdui site in the Sichuan basin along the Jian River, as well as a number of archaeological finds in and around modern Hunan Province that are commonly associated with Chu culture and that are featured in China Institute’s spring 2011 exhibition, Along the Yangzi River: Regional Culture of the Bronze Age from Hunan (see map on the left). These various finds evoke a complex but intriguing story of the cultural diffusion of bronze metallurgy and of local identities evident when comparing individual pieces from specific regional sites and those of other regions. What emerges is a fuller picture of a complex human geography associated with different geographic regions in ancient China.

An example of these distinctive features can be seen in the remarkable bronze standing figure of the Sanxingdui find (see mid-section to the left) and represents a cultural artifact that some scholars associate with the later Shu culture of the Sichuan basin. This large scale human figure stands over eight feet tall (including the pedestal) and its humanoid form is entirely unique from contemporaneous Shang dynasty bronze ware of the 14th-12th centuries BCE, although decorative elements on the garment are similar to Shang motifs indicating some cultural interaction. Its oversized hands clearly were intended to hold something (perhaps a weapon or an elephant tusk?), and it seems to represent some symbolic member of the community (a priest or ancestor perhaps?). While it fires the imagination to speculate on what its cultural significance was, it nevertheless clearly shows a distinct culture of the time period.

Another noteworthy element of this piece is its incorporation of four animal heads with elongated snouts on the base that seem to evoke elephants. Elephants once roamed throughout the ecological systems of the Yangzi River, and we can see this evident in a very lifelike elephant-shaped zun vessel from the Hunan region that dates roughly from the same time as the Sanxingdui example (see bottom left example). The prevalence of vessels in the shape of three dimensional animals is a striking characteristic of southern bronze Chinese culture along the Yangzi river.

While it is virtually impossible to know definitively whether the unique characteristics of southern Chinese bronze ware is informed by entirely unique religious regional customs, knowing the geographic locations of finds and investigating the distinctive decorative motifs lends itself to a greater appreciation of the geographic diversity of early China.

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The discovery in 1976 of Lady [Fu] Hao’s burial tombs near Anyang, in China’s northern Henan Province, presented scholars and archaeologists with an amazing find: the first tomb of the Ruins of Yin burial ground to be discovered undisturbed by looters since the tomb was sealed from the light of day around 1250 BCE. Besides the lacquered coffin of the venerated lady-general Fu Hao there were around two thousand items found inside, including over seven hundred jade objects, 1.6 metric tons of bronze-ware and the sacrificial remains of six dogs and sixteen human beings. This was indeed the most important archaeological find in the Ruins of Yin (殷墟), which marks the site of the last capital of the Shang Dynasty. A dynastic state that lorded over the people of the North China Plain two millennia before the common era and oversaw the first known development of Chinese script, the Shang had long been widely discussed throughout the vast tradition of Chinese historical writings, including in those of the great Han Dynasty eunuch-scribe Sima Qian, the standard-bearer of ancient Chinese historiography; however, archaeological evidence confirming the existence of this ancient civilization was missing until the rediscovery of the Ruins of Yin in 1899. Due to complicating factors, including periods of warfare, archaeologists did not locate the tomb of Lady Hao for nearly eighty years, but this single discovery provided them with unparalleled opportunities for studying the Shang civilization and its remarkable culture.

Fu Hao (妇好), chief consort to the King Wu Ding (武丁), was an extraordinary individual, and the riches arranged beside her body illustrate her enormous wealth and the great respect paid to her when she died. Similar to the other tombs in the Ruins of Yin necropolis, Fu Hao’s is actually a burial pit 7.5 meters deep, and its size and large collection of artifacts prove that she was a figure of great importance. The array of bronze weapons, unusual for a woman’s tomb, is an indicator of Fu Hao’s experience as a military leader in charge of several campaigns against other tribes. King Wu Ding also entrusted her to carry out ritual ceremonies, to communicate with the Shang ancestors on behalf of the king, a matter of enormous respect and vital importance to the state. Shang diviners communicated with the ancestors in one of two principal ways: through interpretation of the cracks on large animal bones and turtle plastrons that had been heated and pierced, or through offerings of food and wine. The animal bones and turtle plastrons that underwent this process of divination are known today as ‘oracle bones.’ Inscribed on these ‘bones’ are questions proposed to the ancestor spirits, interpreted responses, followed by commentary. There are 170-180 surviving specimens that refer specifically to Lady Hao, providing evidence of her military exploits and her ritual responsibilities to the state.

Considered quite modest in size compared to other tombs nearby belonging to kings and other nobility, the huge deposit of bronze, jade, ivory and pottery artifacts found inside Fu Hao’s tomb testifies to the craftsmanship of the Shang artisans, and it demonstrates the importance and value of these material objects to the nobility. Due to the time and labor involved in producing bronze and jade artifacts, these items were extremely valuable and were prized possessions (see Material Culture). Bronze ware alone involved the collaborative efforts of a large network of skilled individuals who could mine the elements, smelt and combine the alloy and then construct the ornate, detailed molds into which the alloy would be poured. Besides having a great deal of aesthetic value, these magnificent bronze vessels were highly prized by their owners and were intended to be used in ritual practices of ancestor worship, bestowing honor and wealth on the deceased, currying favor and entreating advice in a dangerous, unpredictable world.

Ancestor worship was a crucial practice to the Shang and later Zhou peoples, and it became a central element of Chinese culture with traditions carried on to this day. The belief held that deceased ancestors inhabited a spiritual realm that existed together with the physical world. Ancestors possessed the power to influence events in the physical world and could act as intermediaries, carrying prayers to the divine forces that ultimately controlled the fearful patterns of the world, from the devastating floods of the Yellow River to the fortunes, good and bad, dealt every person. Ancestors were likewise an otherworldly resource for information on matters both mundane and extraordinary alike. Oracle bones, with their detailed questions and commentary etched directly onto them, provide us with physical evidence of these spiritual interrogations. Meanwhile, the bronze ritual vessels, laid out in the tomb of the deceased, not only symbolized the great wealth and status of the tomb’s owner, but also provided the corpse the means to continue making offerings to the ancestors in the afterlife.

The act of offering food and wine to the ancestors, it was believed, put the physical world in direct contact with the realm of the ancestors. The Shang held a special veneration for wine, believing that the intoxicating effects could induce a psychic link with the ancestor spirit invoked in a ritual offering. Relatives acted as personators, representing the ancestor in physical form and playing the part during the ceremonial banquet, consuming the food and wine offerings until, drunk, he or she would be able to vocalize messages from the spiritual world. Today in China, people still provide food and wine at the graves of their deceased relatives, and often burn paper effigies of money and other prized possessions at gravesites as offerings. The Qingming festival (清明节), celebrated in China and Southeast Asia and known in English a ‘Tomb-Sweeping Day,’ is an especially important day for this ancient practice.

Lady Hao would have acted as this kind of diviner for the Shang king Wu Ding, performing oracle bone ceremonies and acting as personator for ritual banquets. Her importance to the Shang court was clearly significant; but to contemporary archaeologists and historians of China, she has played a momentous role, in so far that her tomb, fortunate among others for remaining away from the prying hands of thieves, has allowed us uncommon access to the ancient world of the Shang.

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The invention of bronze metallurgy heralded a new era for the civilizations that wielded the technology, and the various applications for this amazingly versatile material spread across multiple sectors of society and became deeply ingrained into their culture and economy. Bronze items, whether for military, ceremonial or mundane purposes, were praised for their durability and luster, and bronze technology, most likely first developed in Mesopotamia, eventually moved far and wide once it became a valued commodity. Evidence of bronze ware has been discovered across Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and East Asia, where it emerged sometime in the third millennia BCE. The earliest archaeological evidence for the existence of bronze in China was found to be in the Majiayao (马家窑 ) culture that inhabited the upper Yellow River valley in the northwest of China around 3100—2700 BCE, even though the metallurgical craft did not reach the high form of artistry that we associate with ancient Chinese bronze-ware until the time of the Shang Dynasty, roughly one thousand years later.

Bronze is an alloy of copper with other materials, ordinarily tin – both abundant in many parts of East Asia. The bronze craftsmen of the Shang Dynasty preferred to include a small percentage of lead to the composite, which made pouring the molten bronze less difficult. (Tin counteracted copper’s brittleness, producing a material of adequate strength for use in chariots and military equipment, where it provided a decisive military advantage over earlier forms of weaponry.) Chinese craftsmen, unique among other bronze producing cultures, employed a technique known as the piece-mold process, wherein the mold was divided into removable sections, which would combine around a solid core, leaving enough empty space in between for the molten bronze to form the vessel. While bronze was useful for military purposes, ritual vessels were undoubtedly the most prevalent application, and these extraordinary objects became the very symbol of power for the Shang kings, as well as potent symbols of status for the elite.

Ancient ritual vessels, multitudinous in size and shape, were used in ceremonial banquets as containers of offerings to the ancestors and, as such, were traditionally divided into two major categories: containers for food and those for wine. They were usually inscribed with ornate decorations and some bore inscriptions referring to either the clan or the craftsmen who manufactured the pieces. Some vessels were made to commemorate a significant event, and may contain inscriptions, for example, detailing the success of a certain general’s military campaign or bestowing honor on a revered relative, friend, or ruler.

The craftsmen of these vessels would take meticulous care creating the designs, which, on some of the more complex pieces, are often an incredibly intricate assemblage of animal motifs, faces and abstract patterns. These designs would be worked into the molds and, once the molten bronze was poured in, would produce the reverse of the design on the final product. Although the craftsmen were rarely at liberty to experiment with new forms of vessels, they would, however, tweak design elements, making certain bronzes more detailed, more expensive, and including design elements favored by different cultures included in the Shang trade networks.

China Institute’s gallery exhibition, Along the Yangzi River: Regional Cultures of the Bronze Age from Hunan, displays bronzes of different Yangzi River cultures from the Hunan Provincial Museum in Changsha. While certainly a descendant of the great bronze culture of the Central Plain (i.e. at Anyang), these bronzes possess some unique qualities that distinguish them from bronzes favored elsewhere in China. In terms of design, the Hunan bronzes tend to be more stylized and feature a preference for animal designs, such as the tiger motif prominent on a number of pieces. Many of the vessels were cast in the shapes of animals, such as elephants or buffalo, in a similarly distinctive way. In addition, certain objects were more highly prized in these cultures than in the traditional bronze culture of the Central Plain. While many ding bronzes were the most prized possessions among the Anyang nobility, for example, the cultures of the middle Yangzi region held a unique preference for musical instruments, notably the nao bell, and a large number of these bells have been found in the area. This suggests that the cultures of this region maintained a degree of cultural independence, despite having political and economic ties to the Shang court.

Bronze vessels represent an amazing advancement for ancient Chinese civilization. Only a highly developed, stable society could possess the social and economic structure to produce bronze vessels of such craftsmanship and purpose for centuries on end. Thousands of bronzes have been discovered in China so far, and many more are unearthed each day. Each new find contributes to the field of understanding about ancient China and continues to bring to light the colorful beliefs and ritual practices of the ancient Chinese.

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The earliest pieces in the exhibition, Along the Yangzi River: Regional Cultures of the Bronze Age from Hunan, date from the Shang Dynasty and mark the beginnings of a recognizable Chinese civilization, but also indicate the existence of a diversity of cultures in ancient China. These bronzes provide an invaluable glimpse into ancient Chinese history, both as a testament to the technological advancement of the Shang dynasty as the region emerged from the Neolithic age, and as important clues to the cultures that created these works of art.

Ancient Chinese histories list the Xia Dynasty, founded by the legendary Yu the Great, as the first Chinese dynasty. While some scholars believe the Erlitou culture in the middle and western regions of modern-day Henan and Shanxi Provinces to be the Xia, the Shang Dynasty (ca. 1600 – ca. 1050 BCE) remains the earliest archaeologically verifiable dynasty. It was during the Shang that the first recognizable Chinese script developed and that an increase in specialized occupations indicative of a complexly organized society emerges. The earliest extant written records are the oracle bones found in Yinxu at Anyang and date to the middle of the Shang Dynasty. Earlier examples of characters exist, but these typically consist of clan names and short dedicatory phrases and do not represent a fully-developed writing system. The content of the written material suggests that the ability to write was limited to a small elite class, specifically the shamans who conducted the rituals of divination that were vital to the function and legitimacy of the state.

Archaeological evidence indicates that the late Erlitou had entered the Bronze Age, but the scale of production and quality of work increased significantly during the Shang. The stratification of society and the creation of cities were crucial to the Shang’s ability to support the bronze production process, which required expeditions to locate the copper, tin and lead found in Shang bronzes, the ability to mine these materials, and the military might to protect the workers and goods throughout the process. After the extraction of the ore, the bronze metallurgy process required foundries capable of reaching the required temperatures to smelt these metals, and artisans to create the piece -molds from which the bronzes were cast (see Material Culture). The developments of a stronger state structure exemplified by a code of punishments, an official class, an increased focus on rituals, and an organized military were therefore necessary elements for the successful production of bronzeware under the Shang.

Unlike many Bronze Age cultures elsewhere in the world, the primary use of bronze casting in China was for the creation of elaborate ritual vessels rather than agricultural tools or weaponry. The existence of an elite with expendable resources and a devotion to ancestor worship and funerary rituals drove the production of the intricate bronze drinking vessels and food containers, such as the ‘Square Bronze Zun with Beast Mask Pattern’ and the ‘Rectangular Bronze Ding Decorated with Human Mask Design’ featured in the exhibition (see People and Culture). The expense and technical expertise required for the production of bronzeware demonstrates the value of these pieces to the ruling elite. Bronzes became an integral part of the ritual process by the Shang Dynasty, and Kings depended on them as a symbol of their legitimacy and ability to communicate with and appease the ancestors.

The relation between bronzes, the divine, and the mandate to rule on earth is referenced in a variety of ancient legends and texts. In one, King Yu the Great had nine ding (food cauldrons) cast to symbolize the nine territories of his realm. According to legend, when the Xia Dynasty fell, these cauldrons were passed to the Shang Dynasty and then to the Zhou in the 11th century BCE, linking the symbolic importance of bronze vessels to the legitimacy of rule. While the form and style of bronze vessels varied over time and place, their primary use in ritual ceremonies by members of the elite and ruling families remained a defining characteristic. For example, the Shang preferred offerings of wine during rituals, and therefore produced a variety of wine vessels, whereas the later Zhou Dynasty believed that Shang overindulgence in wine had caused them to lose legitimacy in the eyes of heaven and shifted the focus of production to food cauldrons.

The Shang exerted a powerful force from their core power center in the western region of the north China plain, but they were not the only major civilization in China at the time. Typical examples of Shang bronze vessels are pieces like the ‘Bronze Zun in the Shape of an Elephant’ inspired from animals that lived in the region. Neighboring states existed that were contemporary to the Shang and interdependent, but arose from separate cultural origins and assumed a different path of development. Examples of these cultures include the Ba and Shu people of Sichuan and the incredible bronze works they produced at sites like Sanxingdui. Stylistically, the works vary considerably from Shang works at Yinxu, but some vessels retain the form of Shang vessels and therefore suggest a degree of interaction. Wucheng culture in the southeast is another example of a regional style unique from the Shang. Even within the Shang, stylistic differences existed, with the northern areas tending to prefer more fanciful representations of mythical animals, and the south preferring to depict existing animals on their bronze works.

When the Western Zhou replaced the Shang around ca. 1050 BCE, they retained the Shang emphasis on ritual but shifted the emphasis of worship to tian (‘Heaven’), and justified the takeover by accusing the Shang of losing tianming (‘the Mandate of Heaven’). The Zhou initially exerted a great degree of control over central China, facilitating the exchange of bronze stylistic motifs and trade in metal ore. During this period, designs became more abstracted and bronzes became valued as an indicator of prestige as well as tools for ritual. The inscriptions reflect the shift taking place during this time, as bronzes began to carry lengthier inscriptions indicating the wealth and importance of the owner. By the end of the Western Zhou (ca. 1045-771 BCE) bronzes lost their inscriptions altogether and were replaced with inlays of precious metals and stones. The Zhou Dynasty moved its capital to Luoyang in 771 BCE and its power subsequently declined significantly. Although there was a trend towards consolidation of wealth and power in ancient China, the absence of a strong central state power during the Eastern Zhou (771-256 BCE) resulted in increased warfare and struggle for dominance until the unification of China under the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE. Bronze production remained important following the collapse of the Zhou, but is generally considered to have reached its height during the Shang and Zhou Dynasties. These pieces provide invaluable evidence of early China’s history, writing system, and cultures.

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Antiquarians have been collecting individual ancient Chinese bronze pieces for centuries, admiring the craftsmanship each piece exhibits as well as savoring the classical respect for ritualism so highly prized by the Confucian tradition. Indeed, to look at an individual piece of Chinese bronze ware is to wonder at the metallurgical skill and imaginative design that often went into the creation of that particular piece. For much of China’s Bronze Age the technique used for casting bronze ware was a laborious and complex process where artisans had to first fashion a clay model of the object, then pack an additional layer of clay around this mold that would dry and then be cut into sections and fired. The model sections were then shaved down becoming the core of the mold and the sections were reassembled around the core so that molten metal could be poured between the sections; once the bronze cooled, the mold was destroyed and the surface could be burnished smooth. This process meant that each piece had to be individually crafted each time and the mold then destroyed, making each piece unique – a truly astonishing fact when one considers the unparalleled quantity of bronze ware being cast in Ancient China! This bronze ware casting technique continued until the Eastern Zhou dynasty (c. 771 – 221 BCE), when the lost wax method of bronze casting was introduced allowing for a single mold to make multiple replica pieces.

While it is easy to admire the inherent artistry in individual pieces, it is important to realize that bronze ware in Ancient China was not merely a luxury item made for vain consumption. Bronze vessels were an important part of elite ancestor worship and state ritual; therefore, in order to appreciate the intended uses bronze ware vessels had in ancient China, one must not just look at pieces individually but must consider how they were grouped together and used in ceremonial sets. The various shapes of bronze ware pieces are rigidly classified according to their function as either food or drinking vessels as well as musical instruments that contributed to ritualistic practices. Inscriptions in pieces denote important events and contributions to the state that would bring honor and prestige to family ancestors as well as descendents “for generations without end.” These sets are frequently found in tomb settings demonstrating the ritualistic importance bronze ware sets had for ancient Chinese peoples.

With rapid economic growth in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, increased commercial land development has resulted in more discoveries being made of buried bronze artifacts. This has created a situation where Chinese archaeologists have to engage in salvage archaeology – archaeological survey and excavation must be rapidly carried out in conditions that are threatened by construction and development. While this means that more artifacts have contributed to our overall knowledge of this critical time period in the formation of Chinese civilization, the pieces are often ripped too early from their in situ context thus depriving researchers from doing important research into the relationship of individual pieces to one another at a particular site as well as what the significance of the location might have for our historical understanding. Many of these pieces subsequently enter the black market and are sold to individual collectors, thus complicating the ways in which researchers and students of the era can further benefit our general knowledge of ancient China’s Bronze Age.